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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-1942
___________
EMMANUEL FRIDAY OBASE,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A214-894-473)
Immigration Judge: Tamar H. Wilson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 2, 2021
Before: RESTREPO, PHIPPS and COWEN, Circuit Judges
___________

(Opinion filed: January 19, 2022)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Emmanuel Obase, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of a decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA denied his motion to reconsider its
decision affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of removal and to reopen
his proceedings. For the reasons discussed below, we will deny the petition for review in
part and dismiss it in part for lack of jurisdiction.
Obase is a native and citizen of Nigeria who was admitted to the United States in
2013 with a student visa. In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security issued a notice
to appear charging that he was subject to removal for failing to comply with the
conditions of the status under which he was admitted. Obase did not attend school after
he arrived. Through counsel, Obase conceded that he was removable and applied for
cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), which sets forth a special
rule for victims of domestic abuse.
Obase married his wife, a United States citizen, in 2017. He testified that over
time his wife changed and constantly demanded money from him. She did not work,
used drugs, and was involved with another man. Obase testified that their relationship
deteriorated, that the man threatened “to bump [him] off,” A.R. at 165, and that his wife
told her brothers to break his legs. He also stated that, if he did not give his wife money,
she threatened to jeopardize his work papers, which allowed him to work legally, and to
tell immigration authorities that he had forced her to marry him.1 Obase stopped living

1

An application that Obase filed in 2018 for adjustment of status was referred to the
fraud detection unit, although the reason for the referral is not clear. Obase stated that his
2

with his wife in June or July of 2019. In October 2019, he was arrested for allegedly
assaulting her. Obase believes that his wife made up the allegations in order to get rid of
him. Charges against Obase were pending in state court at the time of the hearing.
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) did not find all of Obase’s testimony credible. She
found the criminal allegations against Obase questionable and believed that he did not
assault his wife. The IJ, however, found the dynamics of his relationship with his wife
unclear and, although she believed that his wife wanted money from him, she did not find
credible his allegations that she had threatened him. The IJ found his testimony too
general and vague in this regard. She also stated that his testimony was at times evasive.
The IJ ruled that Obase had not shown that he had been “battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty” by his wife, as required for cancellation of removal under
§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i).2 The IJ also decided, assuming that his wife was having an affair,
that she was upset when Obase did not give her money, and that her boyfriend had
threatened Obase, that the harm did not rise to the level of being battered or subject to
extreme cruelty by a spouse. In addition, the IJ ruled that Obase did not establish the

wife reported the fraud, but he also said that he and his wife gave conflicting information
in an interview related to the application.
2
Obase was also required to show that he had lived continuously in the United States for
three years; that he had been a person of good moral character; that he was not
inadmissible or deportable under immigration laws relating to criminal offenses; and that
his removal would result in extreme hardship to himself, his child, or his parent. See 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(v).
3

requisite extreme hardship if he were removed. The BIA affirmed, without opinion, the
result of the IJ’s decision. Obase did not file a petition for review.
Obase filed a pro se motion with the BIA to reconsider its decision and to reopen
his proceedings. The BIA rejected Obase’s argument that it did not properly
weigh the evidence of extreme cruelty. It explained that the IJ’s determination rested on
testimony that the IJ did not find credible, and that the adverse credibility determination
was not clearly erroneous. The BIA stated that Obase had waived a challenge to the
adverse credibility finding by not raising it in his prior appeal, and noted the IJ’s ruling
that certain incidents, even if credible, did not rise to the level of extreme cruelty. The
BIA also found no error in its affirmance of the IJ’s hardship determination. It denied
Obase’s motion to reopen his proceedings based on new evidence of conditions in
Nigeria because he had not explained how the evidence changed the prior hardship
determination. This petition for review followed.3
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the BIA’s denial
of a motion to reconsider and reopen for abuse of discretion. Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642
F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).
Obase contends that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to consider his
argument that it had not properly weighed the evidence of extreme cruelty. The BIA,
however, recognized this argument in its decision, discussed the basis of the
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The BIA also found no merit to a claim by Obase that the IJ was biased against him or
that he was denied a full and fair hearing. This ruling is not at issue.
4

determination that he had not shown extreme cruelty, and stated that he had not shown
any factual or legal errors in its prior decision that warranted reconsideration. Although
the BIA did not discuss the evidence, its decision reflects that it considered Obase’s
argument.
Obase also argues that he challenged the IJ’s adverse credibility determination in
his motion to reconsider, that the BIA erred in stating that he waived such a challenge,
and that there was no evidence contradicting his testimony. We are unable to determine
whether Obase waived such a challenge,4 but, as noted above, the BIA also explained that
the adverse credibility finding was not clearly erroneous, and agreed with the IJ’s ruling
that certain incidents, even if credible, did not rise to the level of extreme cruelty. It was
not persuaded that it erred in affirming the IJ’s decision that he did not show that he
suffered extreme cruelty.
As the Government argues, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to
reconsider that challenges the discretionary determination that a noncitizen was not
subjected to extreme cruelty for purposes of § 1229b(b)(2)(A). See Johnson v. Att’y
Gen., 602 F.3d 508, 510-11 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding extreme cruelty determination is
discretionary and not subject to judicial review). Insofar as the determination here was
based on a finding that Obase’s wife did not threaten him, a challenge to this finding also

The Department of Homeland Security stated in opposition to Obase’s motion to
reconsider that it was unclear whether his brief on appeal, which was rejected as
untimely, was later accepted as a result of a motion by Obase. The administrative record
does not include the brief, the rejection notice, or Obase’s motion.
5
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falls outside our jurisdiction. See id. at 510 (stating that this Court has jurisdiction to
review constitutional claims or questions of law).
Obase also contends that the BIA did not address his legal arguments. Obase does
not clearly identify these arguments, but he asserted in his motion to reconsider (and he
reasserts in his brief) that the evidence satisfied legal definitions of terroristic threats,
extortion, extreme cruelty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.
The BIA, however, acknowledged these arguments and correctly stated that whether
Obase suffered extreme cruelty is a discretionary determination. The definitions Obase
relies upon are not controlling. He has shown no error in this regard.
Finally, to the extent Obase asserts that the BIA did not properly weigh the
evidence before summarily affirming the IJ’s decision, as stated above we lack
jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination that he was not subjected to
extreme cruelty. We also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s initial decision affirming
the IJ’s denial of relief because Obase’s petition for review is not timely as to that
decision. Our review is limited to the denial of his motion to reconsider and reopen. See
Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995) (holding that the filing of a motion to
reconsider does not toll the time for petitioning for review of a deportation order).5

In light of these conclusions, it is unnecessary to consider Obase’s arguments related to
the additional requirement that he would suffer extreme hardship if removed or his new
evidence of hardship. See Johnson, 602 F.3d at 512. We note, however, that the extreme
hardship determination is also a discretionary decision which we lack jurisdiction to
review. See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2003)
(addressing hardship requirement in § 1229b(b)(1)(D)).
6
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Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review in part and dismiss the petition
to the extent we have determined that we lack jurisdiction.
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